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A report for the UK Faculty of Public 
Health on the nanny state debate and  
its implications for policy and practice
The Nanny State 
Debate: A Place 
Where Words 
Don’t Do Justice
The Challenge from Nanny State Critics
Nanny state accusations represent a perennial challenge 
to public health agendas; a constant, negative point of 
reference in debates on the measures that we, as a society, 
should take to provide conditions in which people can 
enjoy and benefit from good health.  Large parts of the 
popular press routinely identify and castigate the nanny 
state when reporting on public health policies and inter-
ventions.  We see attacks under headlines such as:
A Nanny State that Dictates What We Drink Will 
Soon Be Telling Us How To Think (Daily Mail, 28th 
November, 2012 )
Why Are We Paying £3.9bn for 5,000 Nannying Civil 
Servants to Patronise Us? (The Sun, 6th March, 2018 )
Nanny-State ROASTED As Just Elite ‘Controlling Lower 
Classes’ Instead of Making Us Healthy (The Express, 
13th December, 2017 )
Better Fat Than the Nanny State, Freedom Is All-You-
Can-Eat (The Telegraph, 15th October, 2017)
In what might be described as its most ‘threatening’ form, 
the nanny state refers to governmental interventions that 
philosophers call hard paternalism.  Hard paternalism 
refers to measures that force, or coerce, competent adults 
to act in a particular way to promote their well-being, re-
gardless of their own will, values, beliefs, or preferences. 
‘Hard’ refers to the coercive nature of the measure. ‘Pater-
nalism’ refers to its comparability to persons with parental 
responsibility knowing what is best for their children.
We might think here, for example, of laws that require us 
to wear seat belts even if we would not wish to do so.  In 
these instances, the law is based on a policy that holds 
that, whatever we may think, our interests are served 
by using a seatbelt. And if we act against that view by 
not wearing a seatbelt, the government is justified in 
criminalising our conduct. The state uses criminal law to 
‘nanny’ us: it tells us what is good for us and forces us 
to act accordingly.
In legal and political philosophy, hard paternalism is often 
treated as a uniquely challenging problem. What right, it 
is asked, does the government have to force autonomous 
adults to live their lives in particular ways? Special 
justifications are said to be needed if we are to accept 
laws that will force people to protect their own health. 
The arguments run that we might be able to compel 
healthy choices to protect other people from harm (for 
instance smoking bans to protect people who share our 
workplace or other members of the public from ‘second 
hand smoke’). Equally, we might be able to defend 
measures designed to protect and promote the health of 
children and adults who lack decision-making capacity 
(for instance by limiting the environments that they might 
enter). But the state has no right, the arguments suggest, 
to force competent adults 
to live healthy lives for their own good. 
So, in philosophical discourse, we might think of 
nannying by reference to this idea of ‘hard paternalism’. 
However, it is clear from representations in public debate 
that nanny state accusations are also made against policies 
that are ‘softly’ paternalistic. We would say ‘softly’ 
here either because a measure does not force a healthy 
choice, or because it is aimed at persons who are not 
autonomous adults.
In regard to the former, consider how criticisms are made 
of policies that advise people on healthy choices: of meas-
ures that explain to people the evidence about what will 
serve their health, as contrasted with policies that would 
force them to make healthy choices. A good example 
is Public Health England (PHE)’s recommendations on 
alcohol intake.  This is advisory, with no question of gov-
ernment coercion. In its report on PHE’s guidelines, The 
Sun newspaper notes that they are just recommendations, 
but nevertheless characterises them as ‘“nanny state” 
plans’, with the article’s headline reading:
SUP YOURS: Fury at government’s killjoy health 
ruling that sets new booze limit at just SIX pints a week 
In regard to measures that are aimed at persons who 
are not competent, autonomous adults, consider the 
following example of a response to a policy to improve 
the diets of children. The Daily Mail carried a report 
that categorises this as “an intrusion by a ‘nanny state’”, 
under the headline:
Parents’ fury after primary school becomes first in the UK 
to ban packed lunches because fewer than 1% of them 
were healthy enough 
In sum, when politicians and members of the public 
health community are confronted with accusations of 
‘nannying’, the concern in practice is not just with ‘hard 
paternalism’. ‘Soft paternalism’ may also be characterised 
as ‘nannying’.  And things are additionally complicated 
because sometimes it is suggested that accepting a ‘soft’ 
measure places us on a dangerous ‘slippery slope’ to 
becoming a nanny state. 
At the level of principle, accusations of nanny statism 
can therefore be seen to refer to a range of philosophical 
concerns about policy and paternalism:
‘Hard paternalistic’ concerns that the state should not 
coerce competent adults to be healthy;
Similar concerns about non-coercive paternalistic policy, 
such that it is wrong for government agencies such as 
Public Health England to advise on healthy choices; and
Concerns that non-coercive health policy may problemati-
cally be the ‘thin end of the wedge’.
These important principled concerns should be taken 
seriously in debates on health policy. However, it must 
also be recognised that in practice we find references to 
nanny statism that appear, on any terms, to be arbitrary or otherwise 
incoherent.
Arbitrary or incoherent references to a measure being nanny statist 
arise because we find claims that just do not make sense. In theory, 
this means the nanny state accusation should not stick, but in practice 
we know that it can do. Such nanny state accusations close down 
debate, rather than allow a sensible discussion of the merits (or 
otherwise) of the measure under issue.
Instances of arbitrariness or incoherence in the use of nanny state 
accusations are found where:
Some measures of health promotion are supported, whilst others are 
derided as being ‘nanny statist’, notwithstanding that they are no less 
paternalistic in their aims or methods; or
A measure may have implications in terms of its impact on health, 
but as a policy has no rational connection whatever to hard or soft 
paternalism.
An example of the first is found in an article published by The Sun in 
August 2016 under the apparently public health friendly headline:
The Sun Says: Britain must get its act together as the obesity crisis is 
not only killing our NHS but us too 
The article explicitly welcomes the government’s anti-obesity 
strategy. But in presenting its opposition to some measures and 
support of others, it says:
We remain opposed to the sugar tax—a regressive measure targeted 
at the poorest—but are pleased to see the PM ditch intrusive nanny 
state proposals aimed at branding and advertising.
And we fully endorse clearer food labelling, which the Government 
is now free to implement having previously been banned by 
Brussels.
The solution to Britain’s expanding waistlines isn’t pushing people 
into poverty or food companies out of business.
It’s getting kids and adults off the sofa and exercising outdoors.
We might challenge the substantive claims made here: for example, 
we might ask what the evidence base is that the ‘sugar tax’ 
pushes people into poverty. Beyond that, what we see here is the 
apparently arbitrary application of the term ‘nanny state’. From 
the perspective of nanny state concerns, it is not clear why some of 
the measures are supported and others attacked. There is no sound 
reason to suggest that it would be nannying to prevent people from 
seeing adverts but not nannying to promote exercise. In logic, either 
both are nannying or neither is, and the material difference between 
the two seems in reality to relate to the former representing an 
interference with commercial freedoms. 
Regarding arbitrary or incoherent references to nanny statism where 
a policy would not be rooted in hard or soft paternalism at all, we 
might refer to a story published on BBC News in October 2018 
under the following headline:
Is meat’s climate impact too hot for politicians? 
This article concerns the impact of the meat industry on carbon 
emissions, and consequent arguments that we ought to reduce meat 
consumption to mitigate the problem. In an interview about the 
role of government in advising on a ‘climate-friendly diet’, and in 
response specifically to whether Cabinet members should lead by 
example, the climate minister is quoted as saying:
I think you’re describing the worst sort of Nanny State ever. Who 
would I be to sit there advising people in the country coming home 
after a hard day of work not to have steak and chips?... Please…
There may be good reasons for government not to act or interfere in 
the ways asked about. But it is unclear how or why the question is 
related to the nanny state (less still ‘the worst sort of Nanny State’). 
The policy would be based on concerns about conservation of the 
environment; not about promoting individuals’ health, coercively or 
otherwise. We see here a nanny state accusation that is potentially 
effective at closing down debate, but which has no logical relation-
ship with the policy that it is levelled against. It is comparable to 
saying that efforts to reduce the use of plastics, given environmental 
concerns, is nanny statism.
Overall, therefore, the different uses of the nanny state in public 
debate and discourse suggest a need more systematically to break 
down what lies beneath or motivates nanny state accusations. This 
permits an understanding of the merits—or otherwise—of nanny 
state claims, and of how we might respond to 
con-
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The nanny state debate
This report looks critically at the nanny state debate. It has been produced under the coordination of Dr 
Farhang Tahzib, Chair of the Public Health Ethics Special Interest Group of the UK Faculty of Public 
Health. It is intended as a resource for members of the public health community whose own reflections 
or practice are affected by nanny state concerns, and for other readers who may be interested in the 
ethical legitimacy of public health practice and policy.
The nanny state is a frequent point of reference in academic, public, and political debates on public 
health policy. As with many political slurs, it refers at once both to valid and invalid concerns. It 
reduces these to hard-hitting and often logically-incoherent rhetoric; rhetoric that obscures meaningful 
discussion and obstructs pathways (whatever one’s political leanings) to a fairer, healthier society.
At its best, the nanny state is intended to represent a political-philosophical position; a view on 
public health ethics and on the source and constraints of politically legitimate actions and agendas of 
government. At its worst, it is an incoherent slogan that is lazily or cynically made against policies that 
a person, group, or organisation wants to shout down without explaining why. Either way, nanny state 
accusations require to be scrutinised because the nanny state debate directly impacts policies that may 
protect or promote the public’s health, as well as people’s views on such policies.
Accordingly, this report aims to summarise and explain key points implied by and related to the nanny 
state in practice: it aims to make clear what people ‘do’ with nanny state accusations, and how we 
might respond to their claims. It discusses these matters as part of broader political debates that impact 
on efforts ethically to protect and promote the public’s health. It does so too with regard to a social 
context in which damage is done—in the form of harms and injustices—by questionable arguments that 
are based on nanny state accusations.
An earlier draft of this report was circulated to colleagues working in public health ethics, leadership, 
practice, and training. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments, observations, and questions 
that were provided consequent to that consultation exercise.
Responsibility for the final drafting and the views expressed is the author’s own.
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Foreword
For some, the role of the state should be to do as little as possible. It should not meddle in the affairs 
of its private citizens and it should leave business unfettered in its pursuit of the wealth it creates for 
the benefit of us all. I’ve heard it suggested that the role of the state was to provide the military and 
the roads – protect the borders, secure the peace, and oversee free access… We have always had rules 
though. It’s always been a good idea to agree which side of the road to drive our chariots. It’s always 
been a good idea not to drop our waste products in our neighbour’s garden. We follow rules for our 
common good, and to avoid wearying disputes and unnecessary conflicts. But what about the butcher 
who sells us bad meat? What happens to the individual who refuses treatment for a communicable 
disease? What happens to the drunk driver? What happens when we don’t follow the rules? We didn’t 
know about them? Or we just deliberately broke them? How do we ensure a common understanding of 
rules we think we have? And where is the sanction when we break rules knowingly? 
Bit by bit, we have evolved laws to protect the health of our citizens and our environments. And 
little by little we have come to appreciate that good laws for our protection have our consent and our 
confidence. Sometimes these laws are for the general good; sometimes for the protection of vulnerable 
groups and individuals.
In this era of the unbridled greed of multinational corporations, we cannot presume that everyone 
knows where they can safely dispose of their waste and whether they will choose to do it or not. We 
cannot assume there will be fair use of natural resources and we cannot assume these corporations will 
not be butchers selling us bad meat. 
I am not sure what the people who came up with the term ‘nanny state’ have against nannies. I didn’t 
have one. I have always thought of them as something very much for the wealthier classes, and parents 
who didn’t want to spend a lot of time with their children. I have always thought of nannies as people 
charged with keeping their children safe and able to grow up strong, wise and healthy. I would think 
those would be no bad aims for our governments. I imagine that, as in all walks of life, there are 
nannies who are caring or overbearing, kindly or cruel. Likewise, there will be law-making that can be 
all of these things too. 
We live in an unequal world; there is economic inequality between and within countries and not 
everyone benefits from the economic adventure. There is environmental injustice; the poorest 
people live in the poorest environments and suffer the double jeopardy of poor social and economic 
opportunity and the added stressors of pollution in all its forms. The health of the planet is also 
suffering; we are threatening the health of future generations by living unsustainably, by destroying 
natural habitats, ecosystems, our food sources and the soil beneath our feet. There must be some agreed 
controls. This report is a contribution to the debate about what those controls should and should not be. 
Professor John Middleton 
President, UK Faculty of Public Health 
October 23rd 2018 
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1. Introduction
The term ‘nanny state’, like other popular 
political slurs, has contestable historical 
origins. It is widely attributed to Iain Macleod 
(1913-70), a Conservative Member of 
Parliament whose government roles included 
serving as Minister of Health. Mr Macleod 
famously used the phrase in his ‘Quoodle’ 
column in The Spectator in 1965.1 Over half 
a century later, the nanny state remains a 
frequent and forceful presence in debates on 
health policy.
At the core of nanny state accusations is the 
following line of reasoning:
  We are competent, autonomous individuals;
  This means that we always know best our 
own interests and how to protect them;
  And that means that government has 
no business in ‘nannying’ us into living 
healthy lives.
The idea of a nanny state necessarily carries 
connotations of an infantilising vision of 
politics; of a government treating competent 
adults as if they were children. However, in 
practice, nanny state accusations are made 
against all sorts of measures that would protect 
and promote health, whether or not they might 
be ‘nannying’ in this sense. The negative 
traction that is gained by criticising a measure 
as nanny statist means that the term is applied, 
for example, to redistributive measures, to 
interventions that serve the well-being of 
disadvantaged or vulnerable persons or groups, 
and policies that impact entities that cannot in 
any sense be ‘nannyed’, such as commercial 
corporations. In other words, nanny state 
accusations are often made arbitrarily or 
incoherently. Nevertheless, they stick. They 
impact policy and practice. And ultimately, 
they impact people’s opportunities to achieve 
and enjoy good health. This is problematic.
Problems of the nanny state debate are not, 
furthermore, limited to instances of logical 
incoherence or arbitrariness. We have reasons 
at least to question the strength of the premises 
of nanny state critiques. Are we truly always 
competent, autonomous individuals who may 
best judge and protect our own interests? There 
is convincing evidence that our autonomy—
our capacity for free choice and self-
determination—is not always promoted by an 
absence of regulation. Web-based algorithms, 
social media, and false representation of news 
stories all represent examples of threats to 
autonomous decision-making through insidious 
methods of manipulation. Equally, studies 
demonstrate how, at times, people make 
decisions that they themselves would consider 
harmful to their interests: for instance, by 
prioritising short term benefits at longer term 
cost.
Governments have responsibilities to protect 
and promote the public’s health, and address 
the injustices represented by health inequalities 
within our society.2 To exercise these 
responsibilities, policies must be implemented. 
And inevitably nanny state accusations will 
be made. Practice tells us as much. Practice 
also tells us that such accusations can be 
overcome, albeit that this is not necessarily 
straightforward. Consider, for example, 
historical and ongoing efforts to regulate 
and diminish tobacco smoking. These may 
be seen as a model of public health success. 
But change has come more slowly than it 
might have done.3 The nanny state debate 
has had its part to play in this, representing 
views on interferences with people’s ‘right’ 
to smoke: sometimes such claims reflect a 
principled concern; sometimes they may be 
a smokescreen to hide and protect other, less 
principled interests.
In many regards, the nanny state debate is 
a tiresome distraction that interferes with 
meaningful public discussion of health policy. 
Professor Mike Daube, Julia Stafford, and 
Laura Bond wrote ten years ago:
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“  There are legitimate debates to be had about 
legislation, taxation, public education and 
other approaches to protecting the public’s 
health. But they should focus on the issues, 
not on slogans and clichés. It’s time for 
nanny to retire.”4
Ironically (given that nanny state claims 
essentially purport to have respect for 
rationality at their core), it seems optimistic to 
hope for legitimate public debates unhampered 
by simplistic nanny state rhetoric. Those who 
are given to making nanny state accusations 
in place of reasoned argument do not seem to 
be retiring types. This report therefore aims 
to open up the nanny state debate. It explains 
what it means philosophically, as well as 
how it is used incoherently or arbitrarily as 
a weapon in argument. It then relates nanny 
state concerns to debates in public health 
ethics. Finally, it looks to the ways that those 
who are concerned about the harms of flawed 
nanny state accusations might respond to 
the challenges of a public debate in which 
the effect of this political slur translates into 
significant harms and injustices.
Aims
In order to understand and engage with the nanny state debate, it is crucial to think about:
  Principled concerns:
  What theoretical claims are made when a measure is criticised for being nannying?
  Are these claims sound?
  Hidden concerns:
  Is the use of a nanny state accusation in a given instance a genuine concern, or does 
it seem to be a cover for unstated reasons (for example, the protection of entrenched 
commercial interests)?
  Practical methods of response:
  How should we answer nanny state accusations in a way that is at once principled, 
coherent, and effective in a public debate that is often characterised by over-
simplification and cynical argumentation?
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Section Summary
2.1 The Challenge from Nanny State Critics
Nanny state accusations may be based on ranging principled concerns, but may also be based 
on arbitrary or incoherent arguments.
  Principled concerns:
  Classically, claims of nanny statism relate to ‘hard paternalism’. This means 
government measures that force autonomous adults to make healthy choices.
  In the nanny state debate, we often also find claims about ‘softer’ measures: ‘softer’ 
either because they do not refer to coercive policies, but rather, for example, 
government advice; or ‘softer’ because they would apply to vulnerable groups, such as 
children.
  Some participants in the nanny state debate cite concerns about ‘slippery slopes’ from 
softer to harder measures.
  Arbitrary or incoherent arguments:
  The rhetorical strength of nanny state accusations allows powerful arguments to be 
made that are, on analysis, arbitrary or incoherent.
  This may be because they contradict themselves, for example by saying that some 
policies are ‘nannying’ whilst others are not, when all of them appear equal in terms of 
government paternalism.
  Or this may be because particular policies are not about government paternalism at all, 
but some other policy goal.
2.2 Categorising Nanny State Arguments
To make sense of and participate in the nanny state debate, we need to be able to recognise 
and critique nanny state accusations.
  Three distinct foundations to nanny state arguments are identified:
   Claims based on economics: these suggest that the market will be more successful 
than government regulation;
  Claims based on philosophical libertarianism: these suggest that persons’ individual 
autonomy should be respected, and that accordingly we may only justify ‘small 
government’;
  Claims that frame health policy as ideology: these suggest that the government should 
not define health because it is a subjective concept.
2.3 The Healthy Response to the Nanny State
The different sorts of rationale implied by the different types of nanny state critique are 
explained, in particular noting the distinction between responding to empirical and theoretical 
claims (see also section 4.3).
2. The Nanny State: What does it mean, and why do we care?
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2.1 The Challenge from Nanny State Critics
Nanny state accusations represent a perennial 
challenge to public health agendas; a constant, 
negative point of reference in debates on the 
measures that we, as a society, should take to 
provide conditions in which people can enjoy 
and benefit from good health.5 Large parts 
of the popular press routinely identify and 
castigate the nanny state when reporting on 
public health policies and interventions.6 We 
see attacks under headlines such as:
In what might be described as its most 
‘threatening’ form, the nanny state refers to 
governmental interventions that philosophers 
call hard paternalism.10 Hard paternalism refers 
to measures that force, or coerce, competent 
adults to act in a particular way to promote 
their well-being, regardless of their own 
will, values, beliefs, or preferences. ‘Hard’ 
refers to the coercive nature of the measure. 
‘Paternalism’ refers to its comparability to 
persons with parental responsibility knowing 
what is best for their children.
We might think here, for example, of laws that 
require us to wear seat belts even if we would 
not wish to do so.11 In these instances, the law 
is based on a policy that holds that, whatever 
we may think, our interests are served by using 
a seatbelt. And if we act against that view 
by not wearing a seatbelt, the government is 
justified in criminalising our conduct. The state 
uses criminal law to ‘nanny’ us: it tells us what 
is good for us and forces us to act accordingly.
In legal and political philosophy, hard 
paternalism is often treated as a uniquely 
challenging problem. What right, it is asked, 
does the government have to force autonomous 
adults to live their lives in particular ways? 
Special justifications are said to be needed if 
we are to accept laws that will force people 
to protect their own health. The arguments 
run that we might be able to compel healthy 
choices to protect other people from harm (for 
instance smoking bans to protect people who 
share our workplace or other members of the 
public from ‘second hand smoke’). Equally, we 
might be able to defend measures designed to 
protect and promote the health of children and 
adults who lack decision-making capacity (for 
instance by limiting the environments that they 
might enter). But the state has no right, the 
arguments suggest, to force competent adults 
to live healthy lives for their own good.12 
So, in philosophical discourse, we might 
think of nannying by reference to this idea of 
‘hard paternalism’. However, it is clear from 
representations in public debate that nanny 
state accusations are also made against policies 
that are ‘softly’ paternalistic. We would say 
‘softly’ here either because a measure does not 
force a healthy choice, or because it is aimed at 
persons who are not autonomous adults.
In regard to the former, consider how 
criticisms are made of policies that advise 
people on healthy choices: of measures that 
explain to people the evidence about what 
will serve their health, as contrasted with 
policies that would force them to make healthy 
choices. A good example is Public Health 
England (PHE)’s recommendations on alcohol 
A Nanny State that Dictates What We Drink 
Will Soon Be Telling Us How To Think
(Daily Mail, 28th November, 20127)
Nanny-State ROASTED As Just Elite 
‘Controlling Lower Classes’ Instead of 
Making Us Healthy 
(The Express, 13th December, 20179)
Why Are We Paying £3.9bn for 5,000 
Nannying Civil Servants to Patronise Us? 
(The Sun, 6th March, 20188)
Better Fat Than the Nanny State, Freedom 
Is All-You-Can-Eat
(The Telegraph, 15th October, 2017)
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intake.13 This is advisory, with no question of 
government coercion. In its report on PHE’s 
guidelines, The Sun newspaper notes that they 
are just recommendations, but nevertheless 
characterises them as ‘“nanny state” plans’, 
with the article’s headline reading:
SUP YOURS: Fury at government’s killjoy 
health ruling that sets new booze limit at just 
SIX pints a week 
In regard to measures that are aimed at persons 
who are not competent, autonomous adults, 
consider the following example of a response 
to a policy to improve the diets of children. 
The Daily Mail carried a report that categorises 
this as “an intrusion by a ‘nanny state’”, under 
the headline:
In sum, when politicians and members of 
the public health community are confronted 
with accusations of ‘nannying’, the concern 
in practice is not just with ‘hard paternalism’. 
‘Soft paternalism’ may also be characterised 
as ‘nannying’. And things are additionally 
complicated because sometimes it is suggested 
that accepting a ‘soft’ measure places us on 
a dangerous ‘slippery slope’ to becoming a 
nanny state.16
At the level of principle, accusations of nanny 
statism can therefore be seen to refer to a range 
of philosophical concerns about policy and 
paternalism:
1 ‘Hard paternalistic’ concerns that the state 
should not coerce competent adults to be 
healthy;
2 Similar concerns about non-coercive 
paternalistic policy, such that it is wrong for 
government agencies such as PHE to advise 
on healthy choices; and
3 Concerns that non-coercive health policy 
may problematically be the ‘thin end of the 
wedge’.
These important principled concerns should 
be taken seriously in debates on health policy. 
However, it must also be recognised that in 
practice we find references to nanny statism 
that appear, on any terms, to be arbitrary or 
otherwise incoherent.
Arbitrary or incoherent references to a measure 
being nanny statist arise because we find 
claims that just do not make sense. In theory, 
this means the nanny state accusation should 
not stick, but in practice we know that it can 
do. Such nanny state accusations close down 
debate, rather than allow a sensible discussion 
of the merits (or otherwise) of the measure 
under issue.
Instances of arbitrariness or incoherence in 
the use of nanny state accusations are found 
where:
1 Some measures of health promotion are 
supported, whilst others are derided as 
being ‘nanny statist’, notwithstanding that 
they are no less paternalistic in their aims 
or methods; or
2 A measure may have implications in terms 
of its impact on health, but as a policy has 
no rational connection whatever to hard or 
soft paternalism.
An example of the first is found in an article 
published by The Sun in August 2016 under the 
apparently public health friendly headline:
  The Sun Says: Britain must get its act 
together as the obesity crisis is not only 
killing our NHS but us too 
The article explicitly welcomes the 
government’s anti-obesity strategy. But in 
presenting its opposition to some measures and 
support of others, it says:
SUP YOURS:  t gov rn ent’s ki lj  
health ruling that sets new booze limit at 
just SIX pints a week 14
Parents’ fury after primary school becomes 
first in the UK to ban packed lunches 
because fewer than 1% of them were 
healthy enough 15 
The Sun Says: Britain must get its act 
together as the obesity crisis is not only 
killing our NHS but us too 17 
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“  We remain opposed to the sugar tax—a 
regressive measure targeted at the poorest—
but are pleased to see the PM ditch intrusive 
nanny state proposals aimed at branding and 
advertising. 
 
And we fully endorse clearer food labelling, 
which the Government is now free to 
implement having previously been banned by 
Brussels. 
 
The solution to Britain’s expanding 
waistlines isn’t pushing people into poverty 
or food companies out of business. 
 
It’s getting kids and adults off the sofa and 
exercising outdoors.”
We might challenge the substantive claims 
made here: for example, we might ask what 
the evidence base is that the ‘sugar tax’ pushes 
people into poverty. Beyond that, what we see 
here is the apparently arbitrary application of 
the term ‘nanny state’. From the perspective 
of nanny state concerns, it is not clear why 
some of the measures are supported and 
others attacked. There is no sound reason to 
suggest that it would be nannying to prevent 
people from seeing adverts but not nannying 
to promote exercise. In logic, either both 
are nannying or neither is, and the material 
difference between the two seems in reality 
to relate to the former representing an 
interference with commercial freedoms. 18
Regarding arbitrary or incoherent references 
to nanny statism where a policy would not be 
rooted in hard or soft paternalism at all, we 
might refer to a story published on BBC News 
in October 2018 under the following headline:
  Is meat’s climate impact too hot for 
politicians? 
This article concerns the impact of the meat 
industry on carbon emissions, and consequent 
arguments that we ought to reduce meat 
consumption to mitigate the problem. In an 
interview about the role of government in 
advising on a ‘climate-friendly diet’, and 
in response specifically to whether Cabinet 
members should lead by example, the climate 
minister is quoted as saying:
“  I think you’re describing the worst sort of 
Nanny State ever. Who would I be to sit there 
advising people in the country coming home 
after a hard day of work not to have steak and 
chips?... Please…”
There may be good reasons for government 
not to act or interfere in the ways asked about. 
But it is unclear how or why the question is 
related to the nanny state (less still ‘the worst 
sort of Nanny State’). The policy would be 
based on concerns about conservation of the 
environment; not about promoting individuals’ 
health, coercively or otherwise. We see here 
a nanny state accusation that is potentially 
effective at closing down debate, but which has 
no logical relationship with the policy that it 
is levelled against. It is comparable to saying 
that efforts to reduce the use of plastics, given 
environmental concerns, is nanny statism.
Overall, therefore, the different uses of the 
nanny state in public debate and discourse 
suggest a need more systematically to 
break down what lies beneath or motivates 
nanny state accusations. This permits an 
understanding of the merits—or otherwise—
of nanny state claims, and of how we might 
respond to concerns about the nanny state.
Is meat’s climate impact too hot 
for politicians? 19
THE NANNY STATE DEBATE: A PLACE WHERE WORDS DON’T DO JUSTICE 13
2.2 Categorising Nanny State Arguments
Section 2.1 of this paper demonstrates how 
and why the challenge of the nanny state 
debate is extremely broad and varied. On their 
face, nanny state allegations suggest either a 
pervasive cynicism of health promotion or a 
label that is applied questionably to specific 
policies that an author or speaker finds 
objectionable. Looking beyond face value, 
questions therefore arise about why nanny state 
accusations are made. In the nanny state debate 
more widely, this includes a need to look at 
the principled arguments in defence of (say) 
individual freedom. And it includes a need to 
consider whether arguments may sometimes be 
mistaken. In the extreme, we may even go on 
to ask if arguments really serve (intentionally 
or otherwise) to protect alternative (say 
commercial) interests. As Professor Roger 
Magnusson suggests in an analysis of different 
contexts in which nanny state critiques arise:
“  The nanny state is not, therefore, simply a 
philosophical critique, but a weapon that 
assists tobacco, alcohol and processed 
food businesses, and their allies, to resist 
regulatory threats.” 20
Given concerns such as those expressed by 
Professor Magnusson, and the complexities 
explained above in the use of the term nanny 
state, we do well to ask how much any 
given accusation of nanny statism is based 
on principle (and what sort of principle), 
and how much it is based on underlying 
agendas to advance other interests. Such 
scepticism is warranted in particular if we 
consider that dominant voices in legal and 
political philosophy suggest that paternalistic 
interventions can be justified to protect 
vulnerable persons (for example, children, 
adults who lack decision-making capacity), 
and that paternalistic measures that are not 
coercive can be permissible where ‘hard’ 
coercion would not be (for example, warning 
labels, fiscal (dis)incentives). As we have seen, 
in popular discourse nanny state accusations 
are directed at health promotion agendas in 
general. And they are presented as something 
that is inherently problematic.
We may summarise the most prevalent 
principled bases of arguments against the 
legitimacy of ‘nanny statism’ under three 
headings. In its most simple terms, the nanny 
state critique may be framed as a conflict 
between paternalism and individual autonomy 
(or liberty or freedom). However, distinct 
rationales can be identified to support such 
an argument. These are summarised here, and 
developed further in section 4,21 where it is 
explained how the main principled sources of 
nanny state critique rest on, and are thus as 
strong or as weak as, one or a combination of 
the following.
1 The economic libertarian voice in the 
nanny state debate:
According to this view, government 
interference in the name of health is 
economically inefficient: this means that, as a 
matter of fact, we achieve better health (and 
other) outcomes in society if the market rules 
and people take individual responsibility for 
their health.
2 The philosophical libertarian voice in the 
nanny state debate:
According to this view, people should always 
be the judges of their own interests: this can 
mean both that competent adults are always 
best placed to judge how to balance protection 
of their health against other values, and be 
extended to include claims, for example, that 
parents always know best what serves their 
children’s interests.
3 The coercive healthism voice in the nanny 
state debate:
According to this view, the state has no 
business defining, less still promoting, health: 
this reflects the idea that health itself is an 
entirely subjective concept, and that the 
government should have no role in favouring 
particular lifestyles.
The first challenge for the public health 
community in the nanny state debate is to be 
able to recognise and appropriately categorise 
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these distinct sorts of principled argument, 
and thereby be able to respond to them on 
appropriate terms given the differences 
between them.
The second is to identify the overall coherence 
of arguments made in the name of nanny state 
objections: to ask whether it really makes 
sense, on the argument’s own terms, to level 
an accusation of nanny statism, or if there is 
some sort of incoherence or arbitrariness in the 
distinctions drawn.
The third, if doubt is raised by the second, is 
to consider whether the incoherence is just an 
error, as it may well be, or if possibly it masks 
an unspoken agenda, using rhetoric in place 
of reason. In practice we know that nanny 
state arguments have proven powerful. But we 
might ask whether, when scrutinised, they are 
really very persuasive.
2.3 The Healthy Response to the Nanny 
State: Simplistic Slogans Cause 
Injustice
When the premises and coherence of 
nanny state assertions go unchallenged, the 
accusations can prove to be effective bars 
to better policies for the public’s health, as 
well as possibly an interference with other 
sound policy goals (such as environmental 
sustainability). It is for this reason that claims 
of nanny statism have the potential to promote 
and perpetuate harms and injustices. This is a 
long-standing source of concern to the public 
health community, many of whose members 
perceive entrenched interests (particularly 
economic and commercial interests) being 
advanced cynically in the name of defending 
individuals’ rights.22 Whilst some participants 
in the nanny state debate sincerely hold 
principled commitments to economic or 
political libertarianism, or opposition to 
‘healthist’ agendas, for many others these ideas 
are just convenient reference points that may 
cynically be deployed.
In considering how to respond to nanny state 
accusations (a matter that is expanded upon in 
section 4), we should think about:
  The empirical claims that the accusations 
rest on: is there a sound evidence base 
to support the practical claims about, for 
example, the strength of people’s individual 
choices, the neutrality and influence of 
‘non-political’ actors, the distribution of 
burdens of disease, or the effectiveness of 
the market?
  The philosophical claims that are made: is 
a libertarian concept of justice a fair one, or 
should society promote an alternative, more 
collectivist concept of justice (for example, 
a concept of justice that is concerned with 
individual autonomy as well as other 
values, such as well-being, happiness, equal 
opportunity to achieve good health)?
Public health thrives on its status as a field 
committed to evidence-based practice. But to 
criticise policy (positively or negatively), and 
to advocate for reforms, we require values-
based arguments too. Demonstrating, for 
example, that rates of child obesity are rising 
requires a scientific evidence base. But other 
forms of evidence are required to show:
  That rising rates of obesity should be 
considered a problem, whether for 
individuals or for the community as a 
whole: to make this claim we cannot just 
refer to scientific evidence; values-based 
reasons are also required.
  That there are further problems if, within 
the community as a whole, particular 
populations are particularly affected by 
rising rates of obesity: again, evidence of 
inequalities is not alone enough to establish 
that they are unfair; values-based reasons 
are needed.
  How, through policy and practice, we 
might effectively and fairly respond to 
the problem: here we need to refer to 
ethical and political values to understand 
what would be proportionate and justified 
policies.
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Overall, there is a wealth of evidence, for 
example based on the social determinants of 
health, that demonstrates that a commitment to 
libertarian ideologies is harmful to the public’s 
health. By framing health as a matter that 
should primarily be viewed as an individual 
responsibility, rates of mortality and morbidity 
are higher than they are in political systems 
that show greater commitment to social 
solidarity.23 And this empirical reality impacts 
most heavily the most disadvantaged groups.
This is the rationale for public health responses 
to the nanny state. At the heart of public health 
is a commitment to the ethical achievement 
of two moral mandates: promoting better 
overall health, and reducing unfair health 
inequalities.24 If the harms and injustices 
perpetuated by nanny state rhetoric are to be 
reduced, we require effective means of making 
the arguments for these moral mandates and 
the measures that might soundly be used to 
realise them. This requires engagement in the 
field of public health ethics.
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3.  How does the Nanny State relate to debates  
in Public Health Ethics?
Section Summary
3.1 The Political Context of Public Health Ethics
It is essential to appreciate the inherently political nature of public health if we are to engage 
well in debates on public health ethics:
  Within public health such political significance has long been recognised.
  As an academic field, however, public health ethics has only recently emerged.
  Public health ethics involves understanding of political philosophy, with a concern  
both for:
  The ethics of the public health community;
  Theories of social justice.
3.2 The Nanny State in Public Health Ethics
  Works in public health ethics have sought to distinguish and respond to nanny state 
critiques.
  Such efforts are exemplified through the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ denial of the 
nanny state through its ‘stewardship’ framework and use of the intervention ladder.
3.3 Insidious Philosophical Values in Public Health Ethics?
We can learn from critiques of public health ethics approaches such as the Nuffield Council’s. 
Notably, they invite criticism from advocates of less, and of more, government intervention 
for the public’s health:
  From one side, we see challenges that stewardship is just nannying by another name.
  From the other side, we see challenges that too much emphasis is given to the value of 
individual liberty (or autonomy/freedom).
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3.1 The Political Context of Public Health 
Ethics
As we have seen, the nanny state debate 
reflects political concerns: concerns about what 
government should and should not be doing. 
As a field and a vocation, public health has a 
long history of political and legal advocacy, 
activism, and engagement.25 Dr Richard 
Horton, editor of the medical journal The 
Lancet, describes public health as ‘the science 
of social justice’.26 Yet whilst a political 
mission has long been identified and acted on 
by persons within public health, the attention of 
wider academic communities in ethics, politics, 
and law has historically been more limited.27 
With the exception of a small number of 
notable individuals (such as Professors Angus 
Dawson and Robyn Martin), and exceptions 
related to a small number of specific areas 
of concern (such as resource allocation and 
HIV/AIDS), it was not until very recently that 
significant numbers of scholars in bioethics 
and political and legal theory could be seen to 
be concertedly addressing and contributing to 
public health ethics as a field of inquiry and 
practice.28 
In its influential report Public Health—Ethical 
Issues, published in 2007,30 the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics explains why public 
health raises questions that are best explored 
through political analysis:
“  Public health measures raise complex 
questions about the relationship between the 
state and individuals and organisations that 
are affected by its policies. They also raise 
questions about the duties that individuals 
have towards each other. A substantial 
body of literature in political philosophy 
examines these relationships of duties and 
entitlements.”
The Nuffield Council goes on to say:
“  The central issue in public health is the 
extent to which it is acceptable for the state 
to establish policies that will influence 
population health.” 31
The references to the state in these points are 
of critical importance. Public health activities 
of course include non-governmental actors 
and agencies (such as charities, industry, 
academia). But at the heart of questions of 
what can and should be done in the name 
of public health are arguments about what 
government is for. In particular, there are 
questions of what policy aims governments 
should have (what are the proper goals of 
government?) and what means might be used 
to see these effected (what sorts of measures 
or interventions are justified to achieve 
governmental goals?).
Interest in public health and ethics, as 
addressed to governmental agendas, can 
be said to focus on two important points of 
concern, which are usefully distinguished.32  
Perhaps of more familiarity within the 
public health community, we may consider 
professional ethics: here, we are interested 
in the ethical codes and norms that govern 
and guide public health practice. Professional 
codes, such as the Public Health Skills and 
Knowledge Framework,33 help direct the 
practice specifically of those working in 
public health roles. Their function is to guide 
a particular group who have followed a 
particular vocation.
A second focus of public health ethics 
looks to society as a whole, and asks what 
health responsibilities are held by different 
‘stakeholders’—from public institutions and 
agencies, through non-governmental bodies, 
industry and community organisations, to 
individuals. This face of public health ethics 
reflects on the value of health, including 
population health. But it does not end with 
simply the ethics that should govern the public 
health community: it rather is concerned with 
overall questions of social justice, and what 
makes a fair society.
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3.2 The Nanny State in Public Health Ethics
Framing the debate in its political context 
allows us to see the nature and scope of 
discussion of the nanny state. If we are to 
promote a society whose commitments to 
fairness include recognition of the ethical 
mandates of public health—to improve health 
and reduce unfair inequalities—then we must 
be able to identify and categorise the different 
components of dominant narratives and seek 
to respond to these. Furthermore, we must 
do this while understanding that scientific 
developments mean that public health is a very 
wide field: it includes, for example, concerns 
across the lifecourse, epigenetics, addressing 
socio-economic inequalities, health in all 
sectors and policies, and health and global 
justice. Perhaps unsurprisingly, prominent 
efforts to develop an ethically rigorous public 
health show the strength of nanny state 
narratives and how they impede agendas to 
promote the public’s health through public 
health ethics. For the purpose of this paper, 
we might take the Nuffield Council report to 
exemplify the point.
Building on the idea of stewardship 
promulgated by the World Health Organization34 
and the King’s Fund paper on the same topic 
by Dr Karen Jochelson,35 the Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics seeks to distance itself from 
charges of promoting a nanny state ideology: 
rather than embrace or seek to defend 
‘nannying’, it denies it. It does this in particular 
by highlighting as one of its principles that 
public health programmes should ‘not attempt 
to coerce adults to lead healthy lives’.36 
Overall, the Nuffield Council’s report 
advocates for a public health ethics that is 
concerned with promoting better population 
health, ameliorating health inequalities, 
and paying attention to vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups. To account further for 
nanny state concerns, the Nuffield Council 
advances the idea of an ‘intervention ladder’. 
This regulatory model describes different 
levels of possible government intervention for 
public health programmes. These range from 
the ‘lower’, less engaged levels of intervention, 
such as monitoring behaviour or providing 
information, to the ‘higher’, more interfering 
levels such as providing fiscal (dis)incentives 
(for example introducing a ‘sugar tax’), 
limiting choices (such as by banning transfats 
in foods), and restricting choice altogether (for 
instance by isolating people who are carrying 
contagious disease).37 To avoid nanny state 
allegations, the Nuffield Council suggests that 
we should always start at the bottom of the 
ladder, and work up through more restrictive 
or prescriptive interventions always with an 
increasingly demanding level of justification.
3.3 Insidious Philosophical Values in 
Public Health Ethics?
The dominance and force of nanny state 
critiques is clear from the way that the 
Nuffield Council presents its position. We 
may, however, question it from two conflicting 
directions. Interestingly, both of these 
contradictory angles suggest that the approach 
to framing public health ethics is insidious, and 
thus should give us pause for reflection.
First, we can look at public discourse and ask 
how the framing of ‘liberty friendly’ public 
health ethics is received. Two headlines from 
the reporting of the Nuffield Council report in 
The Times indicate a cynicism in line with the 
points raised earlier in this report:
 
Such framing shows, consistently with 
the analysis in section 2, how nanny state 
accusations are not circumvented by avoiding 
hard paternalism (that is, measures that force 
No to the Nanny State, But Yes to Telling 
Us All What to Do Through ‘Stewardship’ 
(The Times, 13th November, 2007)
Higher Alcohol Tax and No Smoking at 
Home—Beware of the New Nanny State 
(The Times, 13th November, 2007)
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autonomous adults to make healthy choices). 
From the perspective of a nanny state critique, 
public health values and methods are insidious, 
and even ‘soft’ measures of regulation or 
measures targeted at vulnerable groups amount 
to ‘nannying’ under another name. 
From a philosophical public health ethics 
perspective, the self-imposed nanny state 
constraints in ethical frameworks such as the 
Nuffield Council’s are also problematic. This 
represents a different sort of insidiousness. 
Professor Angus Dawson has been a consistent 
and forceful critic of the Nuffield Council 
report.38 Amongst other things, he suggests 
that the presentation of the ‘Intervention 
Ladder’ and the mandate always to start at 
the bottom means that we wrongly double the 
value of liberty: it ceases to be one value to 
consider, and becomes a value that is counted 
twice in any given assessment of possible 
public health measures.39 Whilst liberty is, of 
course, an essential value to protect in a liberal 
democracy, it should not be double-weighted 
when balanced against other important values, 
such as health or the reduction of unfair 
inequalities. By overemphasising the value of 
liberty, the Nuffield Council, on this view, falls 
prey to insidious and unwarranted libertarian 
principles. If this is accepted, it follows that 
it provides an inadequate public health ethics. 
This is because public health ethics perpetuates 
rather than challenges or diminishes the 
individualism that compounds threats to the 
public’s health. Theories and frameworks in 
public health ethics are problematic, on this 
view, if they work with questionable libertarian 
constraints that overstate the strength of 
individual choice and responsibility.
Overall, these points have significant 
implications for how we participate in and 
respond to the nanny state debate. Ethical 
concerns go to the heart of our understanding 
of what constitutes a legitimate or justified 
public health policy. We need to consider, 
therefore, the structure and assumptions of 
arguments about how we should advance 
public health policy. And we need to anticipate 
and account for the reception of our proposals 
in public discourse.
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4. Responding to the Nanny State in Public Health Advocacy
Section Summary
4.1 Reflections on the Here and Now
  To have an effect, ethical policy aims need to account for the dominance of the existing 
social and political climate.
  An example is given of a public health strategy that aims to move towards a ‘culture 
of health’ through progressive means.
  The acceptance of the need to progress policy simply through ‘nudge’ type measures 
is questioned.
4.2 Reflective Public Health
  At the level of theory, it is instructive to revisit and expand on the principled positions 
outlined in brief in section 2. This involves:
  An explanation of what is meant by ‘economic libertarianism’, ‘philosophical 
libertarianism’, and ‘coercive healthism’;
  An account of how reasoned responses to each of these might be made.
4.3 Healthy Strategies for Promoting Better Public Debate
  In practice, philosophical reasoning is not enough. The nature of public debate is therefore 
considered.
  Three forms of response to nanny state accusations are evaluated: denying nannying; 
taking on and responding to health-harming organisations and policies; and ‘owning’ 
or ‘reclaiming’ nannying.
  Considerations are raised that might inform our decisions on how to respond to the 
nanny state debate, and policy debates more widely.
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4.1 Reflections on the Here and Now: 
Public Ethics, Status Quo Bias, and 
Nudging Around the Edges of the 
Nanny State Debate
In recent history we have seen an increasing 
role for experts in ethics and law in matters of 
health practice and policy.40 In part because of 
this, there has emerged a scholarly literature 
that examines ‘public ethics’. Public ethics 
describes the points of connection between 
academic philosophical inquiry, public debate, 
and practical social and political change.41  
Within this literature we find compelling 
arguments about the relevance of ‘status quo 
bias’.42 Status quo bias refers to the need to 
accept that ‘we are starting from here’. We are 
not in some abstract philosophical society, but 
operating in the here and now.
This means that we need to account for the 
dominance of the existing social and political 
climate within which a particular policy or 
practice sits. Status quo bias means that we 
take and relate to the society that we live in. To 
recognise a status quo bias does not mean that 
we accept the world as it is. Rather, it means 
that whilst we should aim towards a better, 
fairer society, if we are realistically going to 
make a difference, we must push for reforms 
building from where we are.43 
Prominent public health agendas seem to 
accord with this view, combining ethical 
reasons and agendas with an acknowledgment 
of real world constraints. Professor Dame Sally 
Davies and colleagues, for example, argue for 
what is an ethical mission for public health: 
promoting a healthier society and reducing 
unfair health inequalities. They advocate 
that this is best achieved through progressive 
moves that would create a cultural shift. The 
methods of such moves explicitly recognise 
and fit themselves within a political climate 
of liberal individualism. Professor Davies and 
colleagues say:
“  Commitment to strengthen community 
action as promoted by the Ottawa Charter 
can be seen to be countered by a rise 
in individualism in modern society, 
undermining health and wellbeing at 
individual and social levels.”44 
In response to this dominant political ideology, 
they aim to move in steps towards a society 
that embraces a ‘culture of health’:
“  [A] cultural shift that emphasises a society 
characterised by individual dependence and 
social interdependence, and which embeds 
engagement so that personal and social goals 
can be achieved justly.” 45
This sort of vision, and the approach to reach 
it, brings us into policy debates that aim at 
once to respect libertarian concerns—concerns 
that people should be free to make their own 
choices—and paternalistic concerns—concerns 
that people do not always promote their own 
health and well-being, and that regulatory 
interventions may help them to do so without 
forcing healthy options. As we have seen in 
the previous sections, even ‘liberty friendly’ 
public health measures may face nanny state 
accusations. But some scholars and policy 
makers have sought to overcome the concerns 
through methods of ‘nudging’, or ‘libertarian 
paternalism’: ideas advocated by Professors 
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler.46 We may 
thus explore whether nudge, or nudge-type 
theory, represents an appropriate basis of 
public health policy.
Professors Sunstein and Thaler’s nudge theory 
rests on the idea that people are not rational 
economic actors: we make decisions (even 
by our own account) unwisely. Given this, it 
is argued that we should re-design our social 
and regulatory environments so that the 
easier choices are those that best promote our 
welfare, whilst leaving it open to us to make 
harmful choices if we so wish. For instance, a 
‘nudge’ approach would mean having salad as 
the side dish that automatically comes with a 
food order, but leave open the option to choose 
chips instead. Professor Davies and colleagues’ 
approach essentially looks to the use of nudges: 
we create a healthier environment without laws 
that directly coerce healthy choices.
The dominance of the individualism that 
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Professor Davies and colleagues describe 
represents a clear, political status quo. It is 
apparent, then, why nudge-type approaches 
might be seen as the most fitting. Recourse 
to nudge-type reasoning has, furthermore, 
proven politically popular. However, we 
should not accept it uncritically: it presents 
various problems. These include concerns from 
a public health perspective that there is little 
novel in the idea of policies that nudge, and 
that there are limits to the good that nudges 
can do.47 Relevant questions also include more 
philosophical concerns, such as the question: if 
people are not properly treated as the rational 
actors of classical economic theory, why treat 
them as if they are the rational, self-reliant 
actors of philosophical libertarianism?48  
Nudge theory, and agendas that (explicitly 
or implicitly) use nudge-type reasoning in 
developing health policy, seem to fall prey to 
the double commitment to liberty as just one 
important value, in the way discussed above in 
section 3.3.
This indicates that whilst we need to account 
for and start from the status quo, public health 
agendas should be more direct in confronting 
the challenges of individualism. They ought 
to consider how to defend themselves as 
paternalistic, explaining the weaknesses of 
the arguments entailed within nanny state 
accusations and justifying themselves by 
reference to clear and persuasive reasons. 
This is done, for example, by the British 
Medical Association in its advocacy on public 
health ethics.49 Although individual policies 
that ‘nudge’ are crucial parts of the overall 
regulatory environment, nudge as an overall 
philosophy or agenda cannot provide the 
answer in the nanny state debate. We cannot 
straightforwardly nudge our way around the 
contours of nanny state accusations. It is 
therefore necessary to consider first the critical 
responses that might be made in the nanny 
state debate, and then to look at practical 
approaches that might be suggested.
4.2 Reflective Public Health:  
Marrying Theory and Practice
This report has emphasised the importance 
of recognising that ethical values to direct 
public health policy cannot be established 
just by reference to the ethics of public health 
professionals. Rather, we need to consider 
questions of social justice and policy in the 
round (section 3.1). Accordingly, the key to 
ethical public health is not persuading other 
members of the public health community that 
the public’s health and health equalities are 
values of significant importance. Through 
a public ethics approach, we rather need to 
be able to advocate for health as a value that 
should be promoted all things considered: we 
need to be able to explain how and why health 
matters to everyone.
Although this may not be a welcome message, 
there is no politically neutral ground in—no 
‘third way’ around— the nanny state debate. 
It is crucial in public health to be able to 
advocate to all communities about the special 
importance of health (again as one amongst 
various values including but not limited to 
liberty). And it is crucial to be able to explain 
the reasons why improving health and reducing 
health inequalities are important not just from a 
‘public health perspective’, but for the general 
good of a fair and successful society.
In public debates and discourse, respondents 
to nanny state critiques need to be able to reply 
to contrary political, commercial, and social 
interests and reasoning. Commitment to nanny 
state ideals causes injustices, in terms of harms 
to individual and population health, and in 
terms of the perpetuation and exacerbation of 
unfair health inequalities. To respond to these, 
we need, as explained in section 2, to be able 
to recognise the nature of arguments that are 
implied in a nanny state accusation. And part 
of this means identifying and explaining their 
underpinning rationales.50 
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To help demonstrate how this might be done, 
we may revisit and build on the three areas 
of principled arguments outlined in section 2. 
These present distinct sorts of rationales for a 
nanny state accusation. Accordingly, they also 
invite different forms of reasoning in response.
Economic Libertarianism
One category of argument against the nanny 
state holds that, as a matter of practical 
reality, health outcomes and opportunities are 
best realised through market freedoms and 
individual choice.
On this reasoning, most public health measures 
are economically inefficient. Furthermore, such 
arguments may hold that health promotion 
measures and campaigns (for example the 
provision of a publicly-funded healthcare 
system; anti-obesity programmes) are harmful 
to population health as they reduce personal 
responsibility for health: by providing a ‘safety 
net’, it is suggested, such policies encourage 
people to become less healthy by incentivising 
unhealthy behaviours and attitudes.
From the perspective of economic 
libertarianism, health protection and promotion 
are nannying because they infantilise: they 
leave people who would in fact be able best to 
take care of their health unable to do so.51 
Responding to Economic Libertarianism
The arguments here rest on empirical claims; 
arguments (putatively) based on facts about the 
world. Responding to them therefore relies on 
evidence-based public health.
This is where members of the public health 
community likely feel most comfortable 
responding to nanny state arguments. 
Arguments devised in response to economic 
libertarian accusations of nanny statism 
should be guided by the best interpretation of 
the scientific evidence: where public health 
science (e.g. on commercial, political, or 
social determinants of health) shows that 
interventions would (likely) improve health 
or reduce health inequalities, this will rebut 
economic libertarian arguments.52
Philosophical Libertarianism
According to a second category of argument, 
it may be claimed that to respect persons as 
moral agents the government must always 
respect their rights to make their own decisions 
for themselves unless their choices cause 
unjustified harm to other people or other 
people’s property. This holds where a person’s 
decision seems unwise to other people, or even 
where a person’s decision seems unwise on 
her own terms (for example when a person 
prioritises short-term interests over long-term 
happiness and security, such as by opting out 
of a pension scheme that she wants to be in).
If we accept philosophical libertarianism, we 
hold that the government and public health 
community have no right to interfere with 
people’s right to smoke cigarettes, to treat 
activities such as gambling as public health 
concerns, or more generally to prioritise values 
other than autonomy (or liberty/freedom). 
On this view, the great majority of public 
health activities and agendas are nannying 
because, regardless of whether in fact they 
promote better health, they are unjustifiably 
paternalistic: people have a natural right (on 
some counts even a duty53) to make their own 
choices without the influence of the state or the 
public health community.
Responding to Philosophical Libertarianism
Nanny state accusations that are based on 
philosophical libertarianism rest on ethical 
claims; arguments based on what it means 
to be respected morally as a person. As 
indicated in the discussion above of libertarian 
paternalism/nudge, there may be some 
empirical claims here that can be responded 
to on empirical terms. For example, claims 
that persons are inherently self-reliant, or 
able to judge best their own interests, have 
been criticised for being too abstract, and 
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not reflective of what persons are like in the 
real world.54 Such points are all the stronger 
in relation to decisions made on behalf of 
children, given the special duty of care that the 
state owes to children.
There is much weight to such views, yet 
arguments from philosophical libertarianism 
often treat it as a self-evident truth that the 
government has no right to intervene in 
people’s choices about their own health and 
well-being.55 In this instance, ethical advocacy 
requires fundamental challenges to libertarian 
theory itself. This means combining the sorts 
of empirical claims just described with a clear 
defence of the importance of further political 
values to liberty, such as health and well-
being, solidarity, fairness/equity, community, 
and happiness. In other words, a political 
vision must be presented that accounts for 
and explains the value of autonomy and other 
things that matter. To respond to philosophical 
libertarianism, arguments must be produced 
that explain why good government is not 
limited to the protection of narrowly conceived 
libertarian rights. This may include, for 
example, claims that sometimes protection of 
autonomy is best achieved through government 
regulation, for instance to negate the undue 
influence of enormously powerful non-
governmental (e.g. commercial) actors.
‘Coercive Healthism’/Health as a  
Political Ideology
A third, distinct category of arguments states 
that the government and public health agencies 
and actors have no business even defining 
health, less still promoting it as a value to 
underpin policy.
This view raises challenges that differ from 
those in the previous two because it rejects any 
place for arguments based on public health 
promotion. Economic libertarians do not (of 
necessity) claim that health is unimportant; 
rather, they claim that health is best achieved 
without public health interventions. 
Philosophical libertarians do not challenge the 
idea that health might be a value to pursue; 
rather, they claim that it is a value that should 
not be placed above liberty, and that health 
interventions are therefore only justified with 
persons’ consent.
Claims about ‘coercive healthism’ are more 
radically sceptical. They hold that health is 
too abstract a concept to be defined in the 
first place; health on this view is a subjective 
concept that differs for different people, and 
thus is not something that can or should be 
measured at a population (or other aggregated) 
level, or be the basis of policy. One person’s 
health is another person’s hell, so people’s 
well-being is purely to be defined by them. 
Where measures are instituted to protect 
health or promote ‘healthy lifestyles’ this is 
political ideology. From the perspective of 
‘coercive healthism’, public health activities 
are problematic because they pretend to 
a beneficial agenda (promoting people’s 
interests) when in reality they take an 
undefinable subjective value (health) and use 
this to push an ideological position on what 
it means to live well: by purporting to define 
well-being, the government destroys well-
being.56 
Responding to ‘Coercive Healthism’/Health 
as a Political Ideology
The arguments here again rest on philosophical 
reasons and require to be responded to 
accordingly. The role of empirical reasoning 
is very limited precisely because the claims 
are about values. There are two points in 
particular whereby responses to the challenges 
of claims of ‘coercive healthism’ require to be 
developed.
First, we might respond in terms to the claim 
that well-being cannot be defined other than 
by the individual. Here, we might argue that 
some things are simply, quite regardless of the 
individual person’s perspective, harmful.57 For 
example, to characterise conditions such as 
heart disease or lung cancer as harmful is not 
ideology. Of course, political arguments are 
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required to establish how we should address 
the causes of disease. But in formulating these 
we can argue forcefully that health harms are 
uncontroversially harms, and there are thus 
reasons to address them.
Second, we might look at our practical, 
social environment. The political ideology 
arguments rest on a view that public actors 
and institutions control people’s choices and 
lives in a way that is not matched by private 
actors (for example, large corporations, media 
organisations). Where this is falsifiable, we 
may also suggest that the arguments may 
require regulation precisely to protect people’s 
autonomy and well-being. Whether at an 
individual or a population level, it might be 
argued that attention must be given to the 
influences on our lives and health, whether 
these come from government agencies or 
organisations such as the food industry, social 
media, or news media. This includes the need 
for a platform for public health advocacy 
to serve as a corrective where our social 
and commercial environments themselves 
are doing damage in the ways feared by the 
manner of philosophical reason described here.58 
This all makes clear that there are qualitatively 
distinct arguments to address in different 
instances if we want to ameliorate the harms 
and wrongs caused by acceptance and 
perpetuation of nanny state critiques. It is 
crucial to be able to distinguish the different 
sorts of arguments: economic/empirical claims 
about how an optimally healthy society is 
achieved, and philosophical arguments about 
the proper roles of government. Necessarily, all 
of these require engaged discussion of values 
and principles: what is optimal health?; and 
what values should be protected politically?
And of course, as demonstrated in section 2.1, 
there are nanny state accusations that are not 
the product of different sorts of principled 
reasoning. We must also keep an eye on 
the possibility that particular nanny state 
accusations may be arbitrary or incoherent. 
Overall, this means intellectually there are two 
key tasks for responding to the nanny state 
debate:
  First, building capacity to identify the 
different sorts of reasons that arise in the 
debate, and thus being able to respond to 
them on appropriate terms, asking such 
questions as:
  Where an empirical claim is made, 
for example that plain packaging will 
not reduce tobacco use, what is the 
scientific evidence base?
  Where a philosophical claim is made, 
for example that society is fairest when 
government does not promote health, 
is it a claim that can be sustained when 
we reflect on the values as a whole that 
society should promote?
  Within the structure of an argument, is 
a person or organisation making claims 
that hold together, or do they contradict 
themselves, for example by saying 
that one health promotion measure is 
to be recommended but that another 
measure that is no more interventionist 
is unjustified nannying?
  Is it the case that in fact a nanny state 
accusation is irrelevant to the policy 
or measure under discussion, for 
example because the policy is about 
environmental protection rather than 
health promotion?
  Second, building capacity to present in 
positive terms an account of how and why 
public health priorities should be accepted 
as guiding overall social and political 
priorities. This requires the development of 
more than a ‘public health perspective’:
  Account must be given of how health 
corresponds to other (sometimes 
conflicting or competing) values: we 
need to establish substantive values; 
establish what matters.
  This will include health and well-being, 
solidarity, fairness/equity, community, 
happiness.
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  Importantly, we are looking here not 
at the professional values of the public 
health workforce (though these may 
overlap), but the political values of our 
society as a whole.
  As well as substantive values, we need 
to consider procedural values; establish 
the ethical means to achieve policy 
ends.
  This will include values such as 
democratic methods of decision-
making, proportionality, transparency 
and accountability, cycles of planning 
and responsiveness in regulation, and 
respect for human rights.
These principled underpinnings should serve to 
ensure that the messages and methods of public 
health advocacy are ethically robust. However, 
when looking at the nanny state debate, 
we might ask not just how to understand 
the arguments, but also how practically to 
formulate a response. Policy requires public 
understanding and support. We need to be 
able to ‘translate’ philosophical messages into 
language that is accessible and clear. And we 
need to recognise that the nanny state debate 
takes place in an arena wherein simply winning 
the philosophical argument is not enough. 
Section 4.3 therefore looks at some of the 
positions on practical advocacy from within 
the public health literature.
4.3 Healthy Strategies for Promoting Better 
Public Debate
This report has explained how nanny state 
critiques are formulated. We have seen that 
in practice they may apply to any public 
health measure: they are not limited to 
coercive interventions. And we have seen 
too that in practice nanny state accusations 
may be applied arbitrarily or incoherently to 
demonise some health promotion measures 
and not others. We have also seen nanny state 
accusations made against policy proposals that 
are not even about promoting individual or 
population health.
This report has explained how nanny state 
ideas and ideals have impacted on public 
health ethics, and how a robustly ethical public 
health might allow us to recognise and respond 
to different sorts of nanny state argument. 
Throughout the discussion it has been clear 
that the nanny state debate is a public debate, 
and one that provokes political disagreement.
Given this real world context, we must remain 
constantly aware that the nanny state cannot 
simply be debated according to the ‘rules’ of 
a university seminar discussion. In unpicking 
the rationales and reasoning that support a 
nanny state accusation we do require skills in 
critical reasoning (reflected in the discussion 
in section 4.2). But in advocating publicly in 
defence of public health policies and agendas, 
we need to consider how to frame the points 
we make given how nanny state accusations 
are made in practice. Ideas about the best sorts 
of strategies vary, and members of the public 
health community may be guided by the voices 
of different public health leaders. To illustrate 
how this might work, we can consider the 
benefits and challenges of three different sorts 
of approach. 
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Strategy 1: Deny Nannying
One way to try to avoid or overcome nanny state accusations is to try to refute them. Consider 
how, for example, in 2017 The Sun reported that Duncan Selbie, Chief Executive of Public 
Health England, denied nanny state accusations. He did so by reference to the idea at the core 
of nanny statism: namely that nanny states coerce healthy behaviour (see section 2.1):
   What Nanny State? Top Health Boss Says He’s Not Running a Nanny State and Doesn’t 
Care if Brits Smoke, Drink or Die  
Duncan Selbie claims he only gives people information to make the right decisions and it is 
up to them how they act (The Sun, 13th July, 2017)*
The strengths of this approach are clear: they aim to defuse the charges levelled against public 
health policy, and explain that the role of Public Health England is to advise rather than 
coerce.
Dr Stacy Carter, Professor Vikki Entwistle, and Professor Miles Little have provided their 
own insightful analysis of nanny state accusations. In it, they explore the concept of freedom, 
and open up means of identifying how public health advocates might respond to nanny state 
accusations. This comes in their analysis by engaging in debate and in particular: challenging 
the accuser’s claims about why an intervention is an unacceptable interference with freedom; 
and highlighting that government measures are in fact crucial to the protection and promotion 
of freedoms that we enjoy.**
Again, such an approach has the benefit of aiming to defuse charges against the nanny state, 
and aims to promote a broader public discourse on what justifies the scope and limits of 
government policy.
One challenge, however, for an approach of denying nannying is, as we have seen, that 
nanny state accusations are widely made against ‘soft’ modes of intervention, arbitrarily, or 
in instances where there is no ‘nannying’ in any sense. As such, this method of responding to 
nanny state accusations looks apt for consideration in points of principled debate, but may be 
a message that is lost in the context of more fraught or cynical public and political discourse. 
However fair the point may be, it risks being undermined by participants who shout the 
loudest in the public debate, who may simply continue to cry nanny.
A second possible challenge, in reference to the first example here, is that this sort of framing 
may perpetuate the view that government should never use ‘harder’ measures of intervention. 
As discussed above in relation to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ report, and the use of 
nudging, this is possibly not an ethical position that should be accepted.
* https://www.thesun.co.uk/living/4014078/top-health-boss-says-hes-not-running-a-nanny-state-and-doesnt-care-if-brits-
smoke-or-drink/ 
** See Stacy M. Carter, Vikki A. Entwistle, Miles Little, ‘Relational Conceptions of Paternalism: A way to rebut nanny-
state accusations and evaluate public health interventions,’ Public Health (2015) 129:8, 1021-1029; Vikki Entwistle, Stacy 
Carter, and Miles Little, ‘Defending Public Health Against ‘Nanny State’ Accusations: We Need To Talk About Freedom,’ 
(November 28, 2016), available at https://chpi.org.uk/blog/defending-public-health-nanny-state-accusations-need-talk-
freedom/ 
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Strategy 2: Take on and respond to health-harming organisations and policies
A second approach that might be taken is more ‘combative’. Rather than deny or try to 
circumvent a charge of nanny statism, this strategy looks to throwing challenges back at those 
who attack public health policy.
Professor Martin McKee and colleagues, for instance, publish papers that identify the 
techniques used by actors including commercial organisations, and recommend commensurate 
methods of engagement by the public health workforce with politicians, the media, and 
different publics. This form of advocacy may be characterised as almost aggressively pro-
health, in response to aggressive tactics by actors such as corporations who are protecting 
interests that are harmful to the public’s health. Writing with Pascal Diethelm, Professor 
McKee contrasts scientific scepticism with ‘denialism’. Denialism involves:
  Identification of conspiracies [where 
they do not exist];
  Use of fake experts;
  Selectivity of citation;
  Creation of impossible expectations of 
research;
  Misrepresentation and logical fallacies;
  Manufacture of doubt.*
It is clear how ‘denialist’ agendas might feed into and perpetuate nanny state narratives. 
McKee and Diethelm argue that public health professionals must be able to identify and 
respond to denialists, ‘exposing the tactics they use and the flaws in their arguments to a 
wide audience.’ This requires speedy responses and effective methods of communication; for 
example through use of narrative and analogy. Writing more recently, this time with Professor 
David Stuckler, Professor McKee proposes four methods that may be taken to advance public 
health messages:
1 ‘Challenge dominant narratives’: here, we might expose how (for example) the exercise of 
corporate power leads to health impacts that are beyond individuals’ control.
2 ‘Shape norms for healthy policymaking’: here, we might expose and challenge the place at 
the policy table of corporations with vested interests in health-harming products.
3 ‘Support communities that have stood up to powerful corporations and won’: this entails 
evaluation and communication of health successes.
4 ‘Align with other social movements’: here, alliances are formed with other fields that have 
shared or consistent policy agendas.**
The advantage of this sort of strategy is that it may be seen as levelling the playing field. It 
promotes the use of narratives that will be well understood in public debates, and aims to 
ensure that health messages are not lost. Such an approach aims to expose the sorts of values 
that are often harmful and lead to social injustices; values that may be hidden behind the cover, 
for example, of nanny state accusations. And such an approach aims to speak in positive terms 
to the value of health promoting measures.
The main challenge of such an approach is its scale and ambition. As Professors McKee and 
Stuckler acknowledge, ‘we are not so naïve as to believe that public health professionals 
can put right all of the problems we have described’. Their advocacy here nevertheless is for 
impacts that can be made notwithstanding the size of the challenge. 
* Martin McKee and Pascal Diethelm, ‘How the growth of denialism undermines public health,’ BMJ 2010;341:c6950.
** Martin McKee and David Stuckler, ‘Revisiting the Corporate and Commercial Determinants of Health,’ American 
Journal of Public Health (2018) 108, 1167-1170.
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Strategy 3: ‘Own’ or ‘reclaim’ nannying
A third alternative is to ‘own’ nanny state claims. On this view, it may be more effective or 
fitting to ‘reclaim’ nannying, as in the headline of the following opinion piece by Barbara 
Ellen, published in The Guardian in 2018:
   Bring on the Nanny State if it Stops Our Children’s Teeth from Falling Out  
(The Guardian, 8th April, 2018)*
Professor Simon Capewell’s advocacy may be seen also to represent a ‘reclaiming’ of the 
nanny state:
“  The nanny state means ensuring a healthy environment for us all. […] The nanny state is not 
a luxury or a naïve socialist aspiration. It is essential for the optimal health of every person 
on this planet.”**
An advantage of this sort of approach is that it challenges the perceived need to deny nanny 
state accusations. It may be seen as empowering in the nanny state debate, and a means to 
inviting more serious consideration of a policy rather than an assumption that it must be 
rejected simply on the basis of a nanny state slur.
A challenge that it presents is that it may alienate those who ‘know’ that nannying is 
necessarily wrong. It will appeal to some people, and persuade others. But it may also keep 
some ears closed to policy debates.
* https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/08/bring-on-nanny-state-if-it-stops-childrens-teeth-falling-out
** Simon Capewell, ‘Are Nanny States Healthier States? Yes’ BMJ 2016;355:i6341
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These three approaches—deny nannying, take 
on and respond to health-harming organisations 
and policies, or ‘own nannying’—are not 
exhaustive of methods of engagement in the 
nanny state debate, less still public policy 
debates more widely. For practical guidance, 
practitioners would do well to refer to existing 
tools: for example, the Oxford Handbook on 
Public Health contains practical guidance in a 
series of chapters on ‘policy arenas’. 59
When considering on what terms to engage in 
and respond to the nanny state debate, there 
are various points that we might consider. 
These include advantages and disadvantages 
summarised in the above boxes. In reality, 
there is of course more nuance in health 
policy debates than sharp choices between 
the sorts of approaches listed here. Equally, 
the methods of advocacy taken by specific 
members of the public health community will 
necessarily vary depending both on personal 
ethics and the specific nature of different roles 
that people hold. Professor Johan Mackenbach 
has noted that: ‘Politics is a struggle between 
conflicting ideologies and interests, in which 
health provides only one of the many types of 
argument.’60 In addition, he explains:
“  Politics operates on a timescale governed 
by elections and media attention, which is 
at odds with the greater timescale at which 
population health and its determinants can be 
expected to change. An emphatically political 
approach to public health may also in the 
long run prove to be a self-defeating strategy, 
because of the dangers of politicisation. 
Politics is divisive, and long-term support 
for public health can be eroded as well as 
strengthened by recurrent political debates.”61 
In Professor Mackenbach’s analysis, there is a 
recognition that members of the public health 
community may engage in public and political 
debates at different levels. At base, we have 
a passive position of simple dissemination 
within the sector itself, only engaging with 
politicians when approached. One step up from 
this, political engagement is limited to methods 
such as submission of scientific reports to 
politicians and the media. A step up again 
entails active efforts of lobbying. And at the 
top, Professor Mackenbach looks to members 
of the public health community becoming 
politicians.
In considering the rationales for operating at 
these different levels, we may refer to members 
of the public health community and the roles 
and rationales that they express for different 
methods of political debate and advocacy. 
We may contrast, for example, the advocacy 
methods of Professor Martin McKee, discussed 
above, with those of Professor Judith MacKay.62 
Whatever methods and levels of engagement 
we might choose when formulating arguments 
in the nanny state debate, what is essential is 
having an understanding of claims being made. 
Does the argument itself make sense, or is it 
incoherent or arbitrary? Where an apparently 
coherent principled claim is being made, is it 
an economic argument inviting an empirically-
informed response, or a philosophical 
argument inviting a challenge to basic premises 
or logic? In responding, effective argument 
must be well communicated and not itself 
become hollow rhetoric. It is essential to be 
able to advance a sound, reasoned response to 
nanny state accusations that can be understood 
and accepted without recourse to the cynical 
or obstructive methods too often found in the 
nanny state debate.
THE NANNY STATE DEBATE: A PLACE WHERE WORDS DON’T DO JUSTICE 31
5. Useful Resources on the Nanny State Debate
Please note that some of the following resources are 
behind paywalls.
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available at https://www.publichealthjrnl.com/issue/
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Public Health, Ethics, and Equity (Oxford University 
Press, 2006)
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Healthier States?’ BMJ 2016;355:i6341
John Coggon, What Makes Health Public? A Critical 
Evaluation of Moral, Legal, and Political Claims in 
Public Health (Cambridge University Press, 2012)
John Coggon, Keith Syrett, A.M. Viens, Public Health 
Law: Ethics, Governance, and Regulation  
(Routledge, 2017)
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(2017), available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
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accusations-need-talk-freedom/ 
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Part 4.
Bruce Jennings, ‘Frameworks for Ethics in Public 
Health,’ Acta Bioethica (2003) 9:2, 165-176
Karen Jochelson, Nanny or Steward: The Role of 
Government in Public Health (King’s Fund, 2005)
Julian Le Grand and Bill New, Government 
Paternalism: Nanny State or Helpful Friend? (Princeton 
University Press, 2015)
Johan Mackenbach, ‘Politics is nothing but medicine 
at a larger scale: reflections on public health’s biggest 
idea,’ Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 
(2009) 63:3, 181-184
Theresa M. Marteau, David Ogilvie, Martin Roland, 
Marc Suhrcke, Michael P. Kelly, ‘Judging Nudging: Can 
Nudging Improve Population Health?’ BMJ (2011) 342, 
228-231.
Martin McKee and Pascal Diethelm, ‘How the 
growth of denialism undermines public health,’ BMJ 
2010;341:c6950
Martin McKee and David Stuckler, ‘Responding to the 
Corporate and Commercial Determinants of Health,’ 
American Journal of Public Health (2018) (online 
advance access, July 19, 2018, e1-e4). 
Thomas R. V. Nys, ‘Paternalism in Public Health Care,’ 
Public Health Ethics 1(2008): 64–72
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Public Health—Ethical 
Issues (Nuffield, 2007)
Public Health England, Public Health Skills and 
Knowledge Framework 2016, (PHE, 2016), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-
health-skills-and-knowledge-framework-phskf 
Thomas Schramme (ed.), New Perspectives on 
Paternalism and Health Care (Springer, 2015)
Jonathan Wolff, ‘Harm and Hypocrisy: Have We Got It 
Wrong on Drugs?’ Public Policy Research (2007) 14:2, 
126-135.
THE NANNY STATE DEBATE: A PLACE WHERE WORDS DON’T DO JUSTICE 32
References
1 M Daube, J Safford, L Bond, ‘No need for nanny,’ 
Tobacco Control 2008 17, 426-427.
2 See John Coggon and A.M. Viens, Public Health Ethics 
in Practice: An Overview of Public Health Ethics for 
the UK Public Health Skills and Knowledge Framework 
(Department of Health, 2017), available at https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/public-health-ethics-
in-practice
3 See Conrad Keating, Smoking Kills: The Revolutionary 
Life of Richard Doll (Signal Books, 2009); Naomi 
Oreskes and Erik Conway, Merchants of Doubt 
(Bloomsbury, 2011).
4 Daube, Safford, Bond, ‘No need for nanny,’ p. 427.
5 Karen Jochelson, Nanny or Steward: The Role of 
Government in Public Health (King’s Fund, 2005); 
British Medical Association, Behaviour Change, 
Public Health and the Role of the State—BMA Position 
Statement, (BMA Ethics Department, 2012); Roger 
S. Magnusson and Paul E. Griffiths, ‘Who’s afraid of 
the nanny state? Introduction to a symposium,’ Public 
Health (2015) 129, 1017-1020.
6 It should be noted that there are also instances in 
commentary and editorial lines within the popular press 
where the idea of the nanny state is explicitly embraced 
and promoted. This of course does not undermine the 
negative connotations of the term, but rather aims to 
‘reclaim’ it. See further section 4.3, below.
7 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2240118/A-
nanny-state-dictates-drink-soon-telling-think.html 
8 https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/5742802/why-are-we-
paying-3-9bn-for-5000-nannying-civil-servants-to-
patronise-us/ 
9 https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/891612/
BBC-Newsnight-UK-nanny-state-elite-lower-classes-
Christopher-Snowden-IEA-liberty-latest 
10 See Gerald Dworkin, ‘Paternalism,’ in Edward N. 
Zalta (ed), The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2017), available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
paternalism/ ; Gerald Dworkin, ‘Paternalism,’ The 
Monist (1972) 56, 64-84; Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self, 
(Oxford University Press, 1986).
11 Some theorists argue for defences of such laws 
on the basis of their impact on third parties: e.g., 
noting that if a person is harmed in a car crash, the 
consequent healthcare costs necessarily have an effect 
on other persons and not just the person who has been 
injured. Even granted such reasoning, there is a clear, 
paternalistic rationale that must be accepted in regard 
to seatbelt laws: Lawrence O. Gostin and Keiran G. 
Gostin, ‘A broader liberty: J.S. Mill, Paternalism, and 
the Public’s Health,’ Public Health (2009) 123, 214-222; 
Sarah Conly, Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive 
Paternalism, (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
12 On the complexities of critiquing paternalism in law and 
policy, as contrasted with interpersonal relationships 
(e.g. between a doctor and a patient), see Douglas N. 
Husak, ‘Legal Paternalism,’ in Hugh LaFollette (ed), 
The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics, (Oxford 
University Press, 2005).
13 Department of Health, UK Chief Medical Officers’ Low 
Risk Drinking Guidelines (DoH, 2016), available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/545937/
UK_CMOs__report.pdf 
14 https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1675437/fury-at-
governments-killjoy-heath-ruling-that-sets-new-
booze-limit-at-just-six-pints-a-week/ 
15 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2687241/
Parents-fury-primary-school-bans-packed-lunches-
fewer-1-healthy-enough.html 
16 See e.g. the TaxPayers’ Alliance, ‘A Sugar Tax Would 
Send Us Down A Slippery Slope,’ (July 13, 2015), 
available at https://www.taxpayersalliance.com/a_
sugar_tax_would_send_us_down_a_slippery_slope 
17 https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1630382/britain-
must-get-its-act-together-as-the-obesity-crisis-is-not-
only-killing-our-nhs-but-us-too/
18 See also Michael Moore, Heether Yeatman, Rachel 
Davey, ‘Which Nanny—The State or Industry? 
Wowsers, Teetotallers and the Fun Police in Public 
Health Advocacy’, Public Health (2015) 129, 1030-
1037.
19 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-
environment-45838997 
20 Roger S. Magnusson, ‘Case Studies in Nanny State 
Name-Calling: What Can We Learn?’ Public Health 
(2015) 129:8, 1074-1982.
21 See also Magnusson, ‘Case Studies in Nanny State 
Name-Calling’; Stacy M. Carter, Vikki A. Entwistle, 
Miles Little, ‘Relational Conceptions of Paternalism: A 
way to rebut nanny-state accusations and evaluate public 
health interventions,’ Public Health (2015) 129:8, 1021-
1029.
22 Carter, Entwistle, Little, ‘Relational Conceptions of 
Paternalism’. See also the blog post by these authors: 
Vikki Entwistle, Stacy Carter, and Miles Little, 
‘Defending Public Health Against ‘Nanny State’ 
Accusations: We Need To Talk About Freedom,’ 
(November 28, 2016), available at https://chpi.org.
uk/blog/defending-public-health-nanny-state-
accusations-need-talk-freedom/
THE NANNY STATE DEBATE: A PLACE WHERE WORDS DON’T DO JUSTICE 33
23 Michael Marmot, Status Syndrome: How Your Social 
Standing Directly Affects Your Health, (Bloomsbury, 
2004); Michael Marmot, The Health Gap: The 
Challenge of an Unequal World, (Bloomsbury, 2015); 
Norman Daniels, Just Health, (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007); Sridhar Venkatapuram, Health Justice:  
An Argument from the Capabilities Approach,  
(Wiley, 2011).
24 See John Coggon and A.M. Viens, Public Health Ethics 
in Practice: An Overview of Public Health Ethics for the 
UK Public Health Skills and Knowledge Framework 
(Department of Health, 2017), available at https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/public-health-ethics-
in-practice 
25 Jochelson, Nanny or Steward.
26 Richard Horton, ‘Offline: Where Is Public Health 
Leadership in England,’ The Lancet (2011) 378, 1060.
27 Ruth Chadwick and Duncan Wilson, ‘The Emergence 
and Development of Bioethics in the UK,’ Medical Law 
Review (2018) 26:2, 183-201.
28 See Nancy Kass, ‘Public Health Ethics: From 
Foundations and Frameworks to Justice and Global 
Public Health,’ Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 
(2004) 32:2, 232-42.
29 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Public Health—Ethical 
Issues (Nuffield, 2007); see also Kenneth Calman, 
‘Beyond the ‘Nanny State’: Stewardship and Public 
Health,’ Public Health (2009) 123:1, 6-10.
30 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Public Health—Ethical 
Issues, p. xv.
31 Ibid., p. xvi.
32 For a more comprehensive of ethics and public health, 
see John Coggon, Keith Syrett, A.M. Viens, Public 
Health Law: Ethics, Governance, and Regulation 
(Routledge, 2017), chapter 2. See also Bruce Jennings, 
‘Frameworks for Ethics in Public Health,’ Acta 
Bioethica (2003) 9:2, 165-176.
33 Public Health England, Public Health Skills and 
Knowledge Framework 2016, (PHE, 2016), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-
health-skills-and-knowledge-framework-phskf 
34  World Health Organization, World Health Report 2000, 
(WHO, 2000).
35 Jochelson, Nanny or Steward.
36 Nuffield Council, Public Health—Ethical Issues, p. 26.
37 Ibid., chapter 3.
38 See e.g. Angus Dawson and Marcel Verweij, ‘The 
Steward of the Millian State,’ Public Health Ethics 
(2008) 1:3, 193-195.
39 Angus Dawson, ‘Snakes and Ladders: State 
Interventions and the Place of Liberty in Public Health 
Policy,’ Journal of Medical Ethics (2016) 42, 510-
513. See also British Medical Association, Behaviour 
Change, Public health and the Role of the State; Paul 
Griffiths and Caroline West, ‘A Balanced Intervention 
Ladder: Promoting Autonomy Through Public Health 
Action,’ Public Health (2015) 129, 1092-1098.
40 Duncan Wilson, The Making of British Bioethics, 
(Manchester University Press, 2014).
41 See James Wilson, ‘Towards a Normative Framework 
for Public Health Ethics and Policy,’ Public Health 
Ethics (2009) 2:1, 184-194; Jonathan Montgomery, 
‘Reflections on the Nature of Public Ethics,’ Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2013) 22:1, 9-21.
42 Jonathan Wolff, Ethics and Public Policy: A 
Philosophical Inquiry, (Routledge, 2011); Jonathan 
Wolff, ‘Harm and Hypocrisy: Have We Got It Wrong on 
Drugs?’ Public Policy Research (2007) 14:2, 126-135.
43 Ibid..
44 Sally C. Davies, Eleanor Winpenny, Sarah Ball, et al., 
‘For debate: a new wave in public health improvement,’ 
The Lancet (2014) 384; 1889-1895, p. 1891. See 
also the Academy of Medical Sciences, Improving the 
Health of the Public by 2040: Optimising the research 
environment for a healthier, fairer future, (AMS, 2016).
45 Davies et al., ibid..
46 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, ‘Libertarian 
Paternalism is not an Oxymoron,’ The University of 
Chicago Law Review (2003) 70:4, 1159-1202; Richard 
Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions 
about health, wealth, and happiness, (London: Penguin, 
2009).
47 Chris Bonell, Adam Fletcher, and Andy Haines, ‘One 
Nudge Forward, Two Steps Back,’ BMJ (2011) 342, 
401; Theresa M. Marteau, David Ogilvie, Martin 
Roland, Marc Suhrcke, Michael P. Kelly, ‘Judging 
Nudging: Can Nudging Improve Population Health?’ 
BMJ (2011) 342, 228-231; C Knai, M Pettircrew, MA 
Durand, et al., ‘The Public Health Responsibiltiy Deal: 
Has a public-private partnership brought about action on 
alcohol reduction?’ Addiction (2015) 110:8, 1217-1125..
48 See further Conly, Against Autonomy.
49 British Medical Association, Behaviour Change, Public 
Health and the Role of the State.
50 See also Lawrence O. Gostin and Gregg Bloche, 
‘The politics of public health: a response to Epstein,’ 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine (2003) 46:3, 
S160-S175 
THE NANNY STATE DEBATE: A PLACE WHERE WORDS DON’T DO JUSTICE 34
51 See e.g. Richard Epstein, ‘In defense of the “old” public 
health,’ Brooklyn Law Review (2004) 69:4, 1421-1470; 
Richard Epstein, ‘Let the shoemaker stick to his last: 
a defense of the “old” public health,’ Perspectives in 
Biology and Medicine (2003) 46:3, S138-S159.
52 See e.g. Marmot, Status Syndrome.
53 Cf Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, (Harper 
and Row, 1970).
54 Conly Against Autonomy; Catriona MacKenzie 
and Natalie Stoljar, Relational Autonomy: Feminist 
Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, 
(Oxford University Press, 2000).
55 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (Basic 
Books, 1974).
56 See e.g. Petr Skrabanek, The Death of Humane Medicine 
and the Rise of Coercive Healthism, (Bury St Edmunds: 
St Edmundsbury Press, 1994).
57 Cf Amartya Sen, ‘Health Achievement and Equity: 
External and Internal Perspectives,’ in Sudhir Anand, 
Fabienne Peter, and Amartya Sen (eds), Public Health, 
Ethics, and Equity (Oxford University Press, 2006).
58  See also Moore, Yeatman, Davey, ‘Which Nanny—The 
State or Industry?’.
59 See Charles Guest, Walter Ricciardi, Ichiro Kawachi, 
Iain Lang (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public Health 
Practice, (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2013), 
Part 4. See also British Medical Association, Behaviour 
Change, Public health and the Role of the State.
60 Johan Mackenbach, ‘Politics is nothing but medicine 
at a larger scale: reflections on public health’s biggest 
idea,’ Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 
(2009) 63:3, 181-184, p. 183.
61  Ibid., emphasis added.
62 Contrast Priya Shetty, ‘Martin McKee: champion of 
public health in Europe,’ The Lancet (2013) 381, 1089; 
David Holmes, ‘Judith MacKay: self-made scourge of 
the tobacco industry,’ The Lancet (2013) 381, 1531.

Faculty of Public Health 
4 St Andrews Place 
London NW1 4LB
www.fph.org.uk
Registered Charity No: 263894
